Explaining ethnic polarization over attitudes towards minority rights in Eastern Europe:a multilevel analysis by Evans, Geoffrey & Need, Ariana
  
 University of Groningen
Explaining ethnic polarization over attitudes towards minority rights in Eastern Europe





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2002
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Evans, G., & Need, A. (2002). Explaining ethnic polarization over attitudes towards minority rights in
Eastern Europe: a multilevel analysis. Social Science Research, 31(4), 653. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0049-
089X(02)00018-2
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Explaining ethnic polarization over
attitudes towards minority rights in
Eastern Europe: a multilevel analysis
Geoﬀrey Evans* and Ariana Need
Nuﬃeld College, Oxford OX1 1NF, UK
Abstract
This paper examines divisions between majority and minority ethnic groups over
attitudes towards minority rights in 13 East European societies. Using national sam-
ple surveys and multilevel models, we test the eﬀectiveness of competing explana-
tions of ethnic polarization in attitudes towards minority rights, as well as
regional and cross-national diﬀerences in levels of polarization. We ﬁnd that, at
the individual level, indicators of ‘social distance’ (inter-marriage and social interac-
tion) account most eﬀectively for the extent of ethnic polarization. However, re-
gional and cross-national variations in polarization between majority and
minority groups are explained most eﬀectively by cultural (linguistic and religious)
diﬀerences. These ﬁndings accord with research in the West, indicating the impor-
tance of cultural diﬀerences as a source of ethnic polarization, while oﬀering little
support for theories focusing on economic and structural factors or the size of mi-
nority groups. They also suggest the likely sources of diﬃculties for democratic con-
solidation in ethnically divided post-communist societies.
 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The removal of communist authority structures has led to the longstand-
ing ethnic antagonisms in many East European states being expressed with
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renewed vigor. In this region, ethnic heterogeneity is the norm rather than
the exception, and majority and minority ethnic groups can be expected
to diﬀer with respect to their acceptance of the value of inclusive principles
of citizenship and their tolerance of political and social diﬀerences (on this
see, among others, Bahry et al., 1997; Bremmer, 1994; Diamond and Platt-
ner, 1994; Evans, 1998; Evans and Lipsmeyer, 2001; Gibson, 1998; McIn-
tosh et al., 1995; Miller et al., 1998; Stepan, 1994). Most of all, they can
be expected to diﬀer in their willingness to accord rights to other ethnic
groups; what a minority demands, the majority may wish to prevent. Many
former-communist democracies, thus, have the potential for ethnic polariza-
tion at a level that could weaken collective community action, provoke in-
ter-group antagonism, and undermine the capacity of the state to manage
conﬂicts of interest—as events over the last decade in the Balkans have
demonstrated.
Nonetheless, the extent to which this potential for inter-group antago-
nism exists varies considerably across Eastern Europe. Although all coun-
tries in the region have undergone a transition from authoritarianism and
command economies to some variant of markets and democracy, they vary
considerably in their past experience, current state of ethnic relations, and in
the degree to which they contain the conditions, which might facilitate or
inhibit the presence of more or less harmonious inter-group relations. East-
ern Europe, thus, provides a context in which the eﬀects of several factors
that may inﬂuence the extent of inter-group polarization can be investigated
empirically. This allows a test of the eﬃcacy of several social scientiﬁc
theories of ethnic polarization.
In the light of these considerations, the aim of this paper is, ﬁrst, to inves-
tigate the extent of diﬀerences in attitudes towards the question of minority
rights among diﬀerent ethnic groups in East European societies; and second,
to test general social scientiﬁc explanations of the extent of these attitudinal
diﬀerences. In the conclusion, we also consider country-speciﬁc explanations
of national diﬀerences that cannot be accounted for theoretically. The data
for the analysis are taken from national surveys of the populations of all for-
mer-Communist countries under Soviet inﬂuence in Eastern Europe.
The analysis has two features that distinguish it from much previous re-
search into attitudes towards minority rights. First, we employ multilevel
modeling techniques that allow the simultaneous estimation of both individ-
ual variation over attitudes towards minority rights and regional and na-
tional variations in such attitudes (see also Quillian, 1995). Using these
models, we examine the contribution of contextual factors, independent of
the measures of individuals’ circumstances and experiences. Second, we fo-
cus on the attitudes of the members of minority groups as well as those of
the majority. This allows greater insight into the potential for ethnic diﬀer-
ences to be translated into political divisions between majority and minority
groups.
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2. Explanations of ethnic polarization over attitudes towards minority rights
There have been numerous scholarly examinations of ethnic relations in
Eastern Europe. Many of these have been narrative accounts of either a his-
torical or a contemporary character and have tended to focus on the behav-
ior of dominant ethnic groups towards minorities (Bujaski, 1995;
Cuthbertson and Leibowitz, 1993; Jowitt, 1992; Khazanov, 1995; Park,
1994) or have examined the situation of formerly ascendant minority groups
and their reactions to their changed status and treatment at the hands of
dominant ethnic majorities, since the demise of communist control (Bru-
baker, 1995; Crowther, 1997; Kosto, 1996; Laitin, 1995; Stepan, 1994). Sur-
vey work in the region has examined the majority’s attitudes towards
minority groups and minority rights, but has not usually investigated the mi-
nority groups’ attitudes towards their own situations or the extent of divi-
sion between majority and minority attitudes on minority rights.
McIntosh et al. (1995), for example, analyze only majority ethnic group re-
sponses and ﬁnd that, ‘a majority of ethnic Bulgarians and Romanians were
willing to grant some of these [minority] rights but hesitant to bestow others’
(1995, p. 943). However, if we want to understand the sources of ethnic po-
larization and by extension its political implications, it is not suﬃcient sim-
ply to examine whether majority groups hold positive or negative attitudes
towards minority rights, we also need to examine the views of minority
groups. It is therefore important to consider the factors that might account
for both (a) the degree of majority tolerance of minorities and (b) the degree
of minority opposition expressed to the majority view. The latter is signiﬁ-
cant because ethnic diﬀerences are most likely to be translated into political
issues when minorities have clear diﬀerences in opinion from majorities. If,
for example, minorities and majorities agree on the need for education in the
dominant language, the issue is unlikely to provide a basis for political
mobilization among the minority.
Thus, the outcome of interest in this paper is ethnic polarization rather
than just majority group prejudice. Unlike much of the social science liter-
ature on diﬀerences in attitudes between ethnic groups, which focuses on the
underlying causes of political tolerance or, more generally, the sources of
negative attitudes towards minority groups among majorities (Sullivan
et al., 1981; see Gibson, 1998 for a Russian example). By emphasizing ‘po-
litical tolerance,’ the emphasis in such studies remains on the majority’s
opinions. However, theories relating to tolerance can also be extended to
provide speciﬁcations of the conditions under which minorities accept or op-
pose the opinions of majorities. In other words, they can use to try and ex-
plain the polarization of ethnic attitudes. We shall therefore test the
eﬀectiveness of four such explanations for accounting polarization over mi-
nority rights in Eastern Europe: insecurity; perceived threat; social diﬀer-
ences; and social distance.
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1. Insecurity has often been associated with scapegoating of ethnic or ra-
cial minorities by majorities. This can reﬂect some form of psychological dis-
placement usually speciﬁed in terms of a frustration-aggression model
(Dollard et al., 1939) or the operation of rational self-interest in the compe-
tition for scarce resources (Sherif, 1966). In the uncertainty and hardship as-
sociated with transition to a market economy in Eastern Europe, we might
expect insecurity to have particular signiﬁcance. Conversely, the presence of
security, whether economic or otherwise, might reduce majority group op-
position to minority group rights. The presence of insecurity among the mi-
nority can also be expected to increase the emphasis given to minority rights
by members of minority groups.
Insecurity is speciﬁed in both economic and political forms:
• Economic insecurity. The existence of economic insecurity has received
the most attention in research on scapegoating of ethnic or racial minor-
ities. To the degree that economic experiences and expectations diﬀer
across countries (Duch, 1995; Evans and Whiteﬁeld, 1995), we might ex-
pect majority groups and minority groups to vary in their attitudes to-
wards minority rights. Positive economic experiences and expectations
are predicted to result in lower levels of polarization over minority
rights.
• Political insecurity. A second way in which insecurity may inﬂuence the
tendency to scapegoat minorities is through the perceived failure of the
new democratic political systems in Eastern Europe to represent citizens’
interests. As with the economy, to the degree that levels of satisfaction
with the workings of the political system vary cross-nationally (Evans
and Whiteﬁeld, 1995; Rose et al., 1998), we might also expect both the
majority group members and the minority group members of these coun-
tries to vary in their attitudes towards minority rights. Positive appraisals
of the political system are predicted to result in lower levels of polariza-
tion over minority rights.
2. Perceived threat. LeVine and Campbell (1972), Sullivan et al. (1981)
and Quillian (1995) among others have emphasized the role of perceived
threat from minorities in accentuating negative reactions from majorities.
This can be interpreted simply in terms of objective factors such as the size
of the minority presence in a country (Blalock, 1967; Fossett and Kiecolt,
1989). As Krueger and Pischke (1997) argue in the German case, high con-
centrations of minorities can lead to hostility among minorities. Or, more
subjectively, it can simply be speciﬁed in terms of perceptions of threat
and conﬂict between ethnic groups (Blumer, 1958). We therefore again have
two types of eﬀects to test:
• Size of minority. The larger the size of the minority group, the higher the
level of polarization over minority rights.
• Perceptions of conﬂict. The more likely ethnic conﬂict is perceived to be,
the higher the level of ethnic polarization over minority rights.
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3. Social diﬀerences. Social psychological research into inter-group rela-
tions and prejudice has focused on social characteristics that correlate with,
but do not necessarily deﬁne, ethnic group membership. The extent of sim-
ilarity between the cultures and lifestyles of majority and minority groups is
argued to explain in part the extent of their attitudinal polarization. In
countries where majority and minority groups have similar languages, reli-
gions, and socioeconomic statuses, majorities are likely to express less empa-
thy with minority concerns and conversely, the demands for distinctive
provision of rights by minorities will be weakened, while if these character-
istics do not overlap, ethnic diﬀerences and divisions will be far less easily
overcome. Thus, in Ukraine, for example, the relatively moderate linguistic
and cultural divisions between Russians and Ukrainians might serve to re-
duce the extent of ethnic divisions (Bremmer, 1994) compared with coun-
tries such as Estonia, where the linguistic dissimilarity and the lack of a
historically shared culture between ethnic Estonians and Russians provide
grounds for continued ethnic distinctiveness (Kirch and Kirch, 1995; Raun,
1991). Hechter (1978) makes this argument more generally for socio-eco-
nomic distinctiveness and Evans and Lipsmeyer (2001) ﬁnd cross-national
polarization on democratic attitudes between the Estonians and Russians
that distinguishes Estonia even from its Baltic neighbors. Again therefore
two types of eﬀects can be distinguished:
(a) Cultural diﬀerences. Greater linguistic diﬀerences between majority
and minority groups will produce higher levels of ethnic polarization over
minority rights.
(b) Structural diﬀerences. Greater socioeconomic distinctiveness between
majority and minority groups will produce higher levels of polarization
over minority rights.
4. Social distance. Finally, we consider what we might call ‘the residue of
history’: the extent to which, above and beyond the factors listed above, eth-
nic groups are polarized in terms of the social distance between them. Past
relations between groups are very likely to condition future relations be-
tween them. There is, in other words, a form of path dependency in ethnic
relations, which results in the inheritance of more or less enmity. To be con-
vincing as an explanation of ethnic polarization, however, such an inherited
antipathy must be operationalized rather than just inferred from its assumed
consequences—i.e., the observation of polarization itself.
For this purpose, social distance can be expressed in various ways, such
as the lack of inter-marriage; or the lack of cross-ethnic social interaction.
Of course, cross-national variations in levels of inter-marriage and cross-
ethnic social interaction are likely to reﬂect the factors described above—
particularly cultural distinctiveness and relative sizes of the ethnic
groups—so that a degree of endogeneity is likely to be apparent with respect
to the eﬀects of social distance. However, if in addition to these factors there
is any further historically based source of ethnic divisions, then measures of
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social distance should have additional net eﬀects on ethnic political polariza-
tion. We therefore propose the following hypothesis:
• Greater levels of social distance between majority and minority groups
will produce higher levels of ethnic polarization over minority rights.
Which of the above explanations accounts for the degree of attitudinal
polarization over minority rights between ethnic groups? To what extent
can we account for country diﬀerences in such polarization? The rest of this
paper seeks to investigate these issues empirically via analysis of data de-
rived from national probability surveys conducted between 1993 and 1996
(details of these surveys are given in the Appendix A). Inevitably, given
the cross-sectional, non-experimental nature of the empirical evidence, cer-
tain assumptions have to be made about the causal nature of any observed
association. At the very least, however, the most basic criterion for inferring
causal eﬀects—an observed association between potential explanatory
factors and an outcome—can be estimated from these data.
3. Testing the explanations: levels of analysis
The above explanations can be operationalized at diﬀerent levels. For ex-
ample, we can examine whether individual members of ethnic minorities have
diﬀerent opinions about minority rights from the majority if they do not
speak the majority language. In this case, we refer to polarization at the eth-
nic group level. We can also examine whether in a country there is more po-
larization over minority rights if a smaller proportion of the minority speak
the majority language. In this case, we refer to polarization at the country
level. However, at the level of countries testing several explanations with
only a small number of countries causes statistical problems. In our case,
the number of possible explanatory variables almost equals the number of
countries in the analysis. To solve this problem, we have divided the coun-
tries, where possible, into regions. Dividing countries into regions has the
additional advantage of testing some hypotheses more precisely. In many
countries, ethnic minorities are not spread evenly but are concentrated in
certain regions. For instance, the Russian minority in Estonia and Latvia re-
side, mostly in the larger cities and the border areas next to Russia (Bakker,
1998). The hypothesis that there is more ethnic polarization when the ethnic
minority is larger can be tested more precisely at the level of regions within
countries (the regional level) than at the country level. Where we fail to ac-
count for such polarization we can then examine whether there are country-
level factors that might explain it.
We thus seek to account statistically for diﬀerences in the extent of polar-
ization in attitudes towards minority rights at three levels:
1. At the ethnic group level: indicated by the extent of polarization between
majority and minority groups over support for ethnic rights.
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2. At the regional level: indicated by the variation between regions in the ex-
tent of polarization between majority and minority groups over support
for ethnic rights. This allows the examination of contextual eﬀects for size
of ethnic group within regions, extent of inter-group marriage within re-
gions, and structural and cultural diﬀerences between majority and mi-
nority groups within regions to be estimated.
3. At the country level: indicated by the variation between countries in
the extent of polarization between majority and minority groups over
support for ethnic rights. This allows a consideration of the possibility
that countries have an eﬀect on the levels of ethnic polarization that
cannot be interpreted in terms of their regional and individual-level
characteristics.
The use of such a multi-level analysis also allows us to examine some
of the issues mentioned above relating to the endogeneity of attitudes and
perceptions. For example, in their study of ethnic attitudes and self-selec-
tion of neighborhoods, Dustmann and Preston (2001, p. 355) ﬁnd that
ethnic minorities tend not to live in areas where they will experience in-
tolerance, but argue that in the British case: ‘While the previous literature
has sometimes recognized that attitudes may determine as well as be in-
ﬂuenced by ethnic context, we are aware of no discussion of how one
might attempt to identify the latter eﬀect in the presence of the former.’
By using multilevel modeling, we can account for the endogeneity of pref-
erences and avoid the methodological quagmire that they mention by as-
suming that although endogeneity is a potential issue for individual-level
measures of attitudes and perceptions, this is less so with respect to con-
textual eﬀects. Thus, if the latter eﬀects are signiﬁcant, they can be taken
to indicate an exogenous eﬀect on levels of polarization. Whereas if only
the former are signiﬁcant, it may well be because people with less polar-
ized attitudes tend to engage in more integration rather than vice versa.
This point will be returned to in the discussion of our ﬁndings.
4. Describing patterns of ethnic polarization over attitudes towards minority
rights
4.1. Measuring ethnic polarization
Ethnic polarization is operationalized as the diﬀerence between the po-
sitions taken by members of the ethnic majority and members of ethnic mi-
norities on issues concerning minority rights. As membership of an ethnic
group can be diﬃcult to establish on ‘objective’ grounds, we use respon-
dents’ self-deﬁnitions to allocate them to majority or minority groups.
Majority group membership is indicated by self-deﬁnition as a member
of the titular majority in each country. Minority group membership is
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self-deﬁnition as any other group. In practice, this means that most mi-
nority group responses refer to one speciﬁc ethnic group in each country
that clearly forms the largest minority. Thus, the Bulgarian minority is
composed primarily of Turkish speakers; in Belarus, Estonia, Latvia,
Moldova, and Ukraine the minority population is primarily Russian-
speaking; the main minority group in the Czech Republic is Slovak;
and both Romania and Slovakia have well-established Hungarian minor-
ities. The exceptions to this tendency are Lithuania, where there are two
clearly deﬁned and similarly sized minority groups—Poles and Russians—
and Russia, where the minority population is relatively heterogeneous.
Hungary (i.e., Gypsies, Germans) and Poland (i.e., Germans, Ukrainians)
have only very small minority populations. Analyses that omit the smal-
ler ethnic groups and examine only the attitudes of the largest minority
in each country produce results substantively equivalent to those pre-
sented below.
Attitudes towards minority rights are measured through a series of survey
questions designed to capture key aspects of mass attitudes towards the rep-
resentation and equal treatment of ethnic minorities. These use 5-point re-
sponse scales to assess agreement and disagreement with the following
propositions:
‘Minority ethnic groups in [respondent’s country] should have far more
rights than they do now.’
‘All minority ethnic groups in this country should have to be taught in
[respondent’s country’s dominant language].’
‘Everyone who lives in [respondent’s country] should have the right to be-
come a citizen regardless of their ethnic origins.’
‘The ethnic group a person belongs to should not inﬂuence the beneﬁts
they can get from the state.’
The ﬁrst item above is the most general in content, referring explicitly
to minority rights but not specifying any particular area of contention.
The other items complement this general theme by addressing more spe-
ciﬁc issues. Thus, the question of majority language use in schools is an
important question in divided societies and, historically, has been a
source of contention in many Eastern European societies. Both the other
questions—referring to citizenship rights and state beneﬁts—have become
politically salient in recent years as post-communist governments have at-
tempted to construct constitutions deﬁning who is entitled to full citizen-
ship and the rules for the allocation of property and other resources
formerly controlled by the state (Elster et al., 1998; Linz and Stepan,
1996).
Answers to these questions are inter-correlated, which indicates that they
tap into the same underlying orientation towards minority rights. Responses
are summed and divided by the number of items to form a Likert scale of
attitudes towards minority rights with a range from one to ﬁve. Three of
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the items are worded in a positive direction—agreement equals a pro-rights
answer—whereas the item on language in school is not.1
4.2. The observed cross-national pattern of majority–minority polarization
over attitudes towards minority rights
Table 1 shows the mean scores on the scale of attitudes towards minority
rights held by the main ethnic groups in the 13 countries surveyed. It also
presents the extent of ethnic polarization, which is the diﬀerence in mean
scores between the majority and minority groups in each country. Finally,
countries are ranked by their extent of ethnic polarization.
Unsurprisingly, in all of these countries, ethnic minorities are signiﬁcantly
more pro-minority rights than are majorities. There is nevertheless a clear
hierarchy of country diﬀerences in the extent of polarization between the at-
titudes of majority and minority groups. Estonia is the most polarized of
these societies—ethnic Estonians and the predominantly Russian-speaking
minority are distinctive in the extent to which they diﬀer in their support
for minority rights. The next most polarized society is the other Baltic State
with a substantial Russian-speaking minority—Latvia, although it can be
seen that the Slovak majority and mainly the Hungarian-speaking minority
in Slovakia display a similar degree of disparity in their attitudes. Romania
is another ethnically divided central European society containing a Hungar-
ian minority as a result of the Treaty of Versailles and it displays a similar
level of polarization over minority rights. As does Lithuania, which has a
smaller and less homogeneous minority population than the two more-po-
larized Baltic countries. The relatively ethnically homogeneous Central Eu-
ropean states—Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary—display moderate
levels of polarization. The least polarized societies are Ukraine and Belarus,
both countries with substantial Russian minorities.
Thus, even this simple description of the distribution of attitudes towards
minority rights by majority/minority status points to the conclusion that one
simple answer to the question motivating this study—that size of the minor-
ity will be crucial for generating polarization over minority rights—is
1 Predictably, given what we know about the eﬀects of response biases for questions of this
sort (Evans and Heath, 1995; Schuman and Presser, 1981), levels of Pearson’s correlation
between the three positively worded items and the language in school item were relatively low
(.29, .10, and .11, respectively;). The language in school item was nevertheless retained in the
scale, even though its presence reduced the overall level of internal consistency (Cronbach
a¼ .52 for the pooled dataset), because the use of minority languages in schooling is an
important issue that has historically been a source of contention between majority and minority
groups in most countries in the region. It also gives the scale some degree of balance with
respect to direction of question wording. This helps to limit the likelihood of bias resulting from
acquiescence eﬀects and thus has beneﬁcial consequences for validity, which outweigh the costs
of lowered inter-item correlations (see Evans and Heath, 1995; Heath et al., 1994; Schuman and
Presser, 1981).
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unlikely to be conﬁrmed. Any ﬁrmer conclusions, however, will need to rest
on the systematic multivariate analysis of competing explanations of ethnic
polarization that follows.
5. Modeling ethnic polarization in attitudes towards minority rights
5.1. The creation of the region variable
In most countries, a part of the sampling procedure involved stratiﬁed se-
lection by region. However, in Bulgaria, there was no information about the
region. Also, because Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have so few
minorities among their populations (see Table 1), these three countries were
treated as one region—otherwise, we could not estimate the dependent vari-
able, ethnic polarization over minority rights. In the ﬁnal analysis therefore
we used 59 regions from the following countries: Belarus (7); Bulgaria (1);
Czech Republic (1); Estonia (5); Hungary (1); Latvia (5); Lithuania (6);
Moldova (4); Poland (1); Romania (4); Russia (10); Slovakia (4); and Uk-
raine (10). Regional level variables are estimated for each of the above re-
gions. After selecting respondents with valid answers to all relevant
questions, 22,137 individual-level cases were retained in the analysis.
5.2. Operationalization of the independent variables
The hypotheses speciﬁed in Section 2 are tested by operationalizing the
following concepts:
Table 1
Ethnic polarization in Eastern Europe: mean score on minority rights scale by majority and mi-
nority groups (N ¼ 22,137)
Support for minority rights
Majority Minority Polarization Rank order
Estonia 2.67 4.24 1.57 1
Latvia 2.77 3.84 1.07 2
Slovakia 2.84 3.86 1.02 3
Romania 3.15 3.97 .82 4
Lithuania 3.10 3.91 .81 5
Moldova 3.23 3.89 .66 6
Bulgaria 2.83 3.37 .54 7
Czech Rep. 2.73 3.21 .48 8
Hungary 3.17 3.60 .43 9
Russia 3.28 3.68 .40 10
Poland 3.13 3.44 .31 11
Ukraine 3.57 3.85 .28 12
Belarus 3.47 3.74 .27 13
All majority/minority diﬀerences of means are signiﬁcant at P < :001.
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1. Insecurity was measured in two ways:
(a) Economic insecurity is estimated from measures of personal and soci-
etal economic experiences over the past ﬁve years and expectations for the
next ﬁve years combined into a 4-item scale.
Economic experience and expectations were measured using four ques-
tions, answers to which were combined to form a scale:
‘Compared with ﬁve years ago, has your household’s standard of living
fallen a great deal, fallen a little, stayed about the same, risen a little, or
has it risen a lot?’ ‘And looking ahead over the next ﬁve years, do you think
that your household’s standard of living will fall a great deal from its current
level, fall a little, stay about the same as it is now, rise a little, or rise a lot
from its current level?’
Each of these questions was also asked with reference to ‘the country as a
whole.’ Cronbach’s a for the 4-item scale was .72.
(b) Political insecurity is measured with a 7-item scale of respondents’ de-
gree of expressed political eﬃcacy with respect to the workings of the polit-
ical system in their country: ‘People like me have no say in what the
government does’; ‘Elected oﬃcials don’t care much what people like me
think’; ‘On the whole, what governments do in this country reﬂects the
wishes of ordinary people’ (reversed); ‘There is no point in voting because
the government can’t make any diﬀerence’; ‘The government acts for the
beneﬁt of the majority in society’ (reversed); ‘Everyone has an inﬂuence
on the election of the government’ (reversed).
Respondents were also asked: ‘How would you evaluate the actual prac-
tice of democracy here in (respondent’s country) so far?’
2. Perceived threat is measured as (a) the size of minority measured as per-
centage of the population within a region; and (b) by perceptions of conﬂict
as measured by answers to the following question: ‘Do you think there is
bound to be conﬂict between the members of the diﬀerent ethnic groups
in [country ] today, or do you think they can get along without conﬂict?’
3. Social diﬀerences between ethnic groups are assessed as follows:
(a) Cultural diﬀerences were measured by:
A regional-level measure of majority language acquisition reported by
minorities compared to language acquisition of majority members.
A measure of denominational membership among minorities and major-
ities. This included all major denominations in each country with a residual
‘other’ category.
A regional-level measure of the extent of denominational diﬀerences us-
ing the index of dissimilarity. This is the percentage of the population
within regions that would need to ’change’ their religious denomination
to make the religious composition of the majority and the minority exactly
the same.
(b) Structural diﬀerences. Ethnic diﬀerences in social class composition
and educational attainment are assessed using the following indicators:
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Social class is measured using a self-report question devised in consulta-
tion with East European social scientists and evaluated in pilot studies. Five
class categories were presented to respondents: ‘entrepreneurs,’ ‘managers
and administrators,’ ‘intelligentsia,’ ‘manual worker,’ and ‘peasant,’ along
with a residual ‘no class’ option.
Educational qualiﬁcations are measured using three categories: none and
primary qualiﬁcations, middle range and vocational, degree and higher
degree.
Regional-level indices were constructed using the ‘index of dissimilarity’
of ethnic diﬀerences in social class and educational composition. As with re-
ligion, these derive from the proportion of the population that would have
to change classes (or educational groups) to make the proﬁles of the ethnic
groups identical.
4. Social distance is operationalized by two measures:
Marital homogamy. We included a variable indicating whether or not in-
dividuals were married; if they were married, we made a distinction between
people in ethnically homogeneous marriages and people in heterogeneous
marriages. The log odds of being in a mixed marriage versus a homogeneous
marriage were also calculated at the regional level. Log odd ratios were used
here to control for diﬀerences in the sizes of minority groups.
Cross-ethnic interaction. Whether or not respondents reported discussing
political issues with members of a diﬀerent ethnic group. This was measured
using answers to the following question: ‘Please think of the two people you
discuss politics with most often, apart from your spouse,’ accompanied by
further probes into the ethnicity of any person or persons mentioned.
In addition, we include age and gender as control variables.
5.3. Testing the hypotheses
In the models, we regress the ethnic rights scale onto indicators of the ex-
planations. The strategy adopted in the analysis is to account for country
diﬀerences in ethnic polarization by controlling for other diﬀerences between
them (Evans and Whiteﬁeld, 1995; Przeworski and Teune, 1970, provide a
recent example in the Eastern European context). More precisely, the aim
is to explain statistically the observed diﬀerences between ethnic groups in
levels of support for ethnic rights in terms of compositional diﬀerences be-
tween majority and minority groups measured at the individual level and
contextual eﬀects estimated at the level of regions within countries. This is
done by ﬁrst entering a dummy variable representing the eﬀect of being in
a particular ethnic group into the model and then adding potential explan-
atory variables. Many of these variables are entered as interactions with
ethnicity, as their eﬀects are expected to vary by majority/minority status.
If these explanatory variables account for the observed diﬀerences
between ethnic groups, then their addition to the model should reduce
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diﬀerences between ethnic groups while controlling for the other explana-
tory variables. This would be indicated by a reduction in the size of the co-
eﬃcient for the ethnicity dummy variable. If these explanatory variables
account for observed diﬀerences in ethnic polarization between regions, then
they also reduce the variance of the ethnicity eﬀect between regions. The net
result of eﬀects at both of these levels is to reduce diﬀerences between coun-
tries in the extent of polarization over minority rights between majority and
minority groups.
We analyze the pooled cross-national dataset as a hierarchical structure
of individuals nested within regions within countries. Neglecting this hierar-
chical structure would lead to an underestimation of the standard errors of
the coeﬃcients, which might lead to the inference that eﬀects are signiﬁcant
when they are not (Woodhouse et al., 1996).
Multilevel models (or ‘random coeﬃcient models’) have been developed
to analyze data with a hierarchical structure (Bryk and Raudenbush,
1993). These models have frequently been applied in educational research,
and more recently, have also been used to analyze voting behavior (Jones
et al., 1992; Need, 1997; Nieuwbeerta, 1995) and prejudice against minori-
ties (Coenders, 2001; Quillian, 1995). Here, we use a hierarchical model in
which the respondents are nested within the 59 regions in the 13 countries
in our sample. The following equations summarize the general model
employed
Yij ¼ b0ijX0þb1ijX1 þ bXij þ bXjþe0ij: ð1Þ
In this equation, e0ij is the departure from the predicted score for the ith
respondent‘s actual score on the rights scale. It is commonly referred to as
residual. The dependent variable Y (attitudes towards minority rights) is ex-
plained with an intercept b0, an eﬀect b1ij indicating the diﬀerence between
ethnic majority and minority (X1), of other variables Xij (varying between
persons and between regions) and Xj (varying between regions). Whenever
an item has two subscripts, ij, it varies from person to person within a re-
gion. When it has only one subscript, j, we indicate that it varies only be-
tween regions and not between persons within regions. An example of a
variable that varies only between regions is the size of the ethnic minority.
We also allow the intercept term b0ij to vary between regions. This is shown
in Eq. (2)
b0ij ¼ b0 þ u0j; ð2Þ
where Uj indicates the departure for the jth region’s intercept from the
overall value. It is a level 2 residual and is the same for all respondents in
region j.
Similarly, we then allow the eﬀect of ethnic (b1j) group to vary between
regions. Eq. (3) formalizes this
B1j ¼ b1 þ u1j: ð3Þ
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We assume that, being at diﬀerent levels, uj and eij are uncorrelated and
we further make the assumption that they have a normal distribution, so
that their variances (r2u and r
2
e) can be estimated. Eqs. (1)–(3) can be re-
written into one equation, the eﬀects of which we estimate. To estimate
these eﬀects, we have used the interactive package MlwiN (Goldstein et al.,
1998).
5.4. Results
Table 2 presents the ﬁnal models selected. Model 1 is the null model: it
includes only a constant and random variation between- and within regions.
The average score on the minority rights scale is 3.46; this varies signiﬁcantly
between persons and also (although less) between regions: :09=ð:50þ :09Þ
 100% ¼ 15:3% of the total variance in attitudes towards minority rights
is between regions.
In model 2, the eﬀect of ethnicity is allowed to vary between regions. This
model is a ‘random slope’ model. We see that the ethnic minority score on
attitudes towards minority rights scale is signiﬁcantly higher than that of the
majority. Because the variance of this eﬀect between regions is substantial
and signiﬁcant (.16 with a standard error of .03), we can conclude that
the diﬀerence between majority and minority groups in support for minority
rights varies signiﬁcantly between regions.
As argued above, in addition to explaining diﬀerences in attitudes to-
wards minority rights between majority and minority ethnic groups, we also
want to explain why the extent of diﬀerence varies across regions and coun-
tries. The extent to which polarization between ethnic groups is explained
can be seen by comparing the coeﬃcients for ‘ethnic minority’ in model 3
with those in the previous models. To assess how much of the variation in
ethnic polarization between regions is explained, we examine the propor-
tional reduction in the variance of the ‘ethnic group’ eﬀect which is shown
in the bottom section of Table 2.
In model 3, we aim to explain ethnic polarization in support for minority
rights by controlling for compositional diﬀerences between majority and mi-
nority groups. Since we only control for individual-level variables, we expect
only a small amount of the diﬀerences between regions to be explained. Ta-
ble 2 shows this: the variance of the ethnicity eﬀect decreases only from .16
to .15. As we predicted that the eﬀects of certain variables would interact
with majority/minority status, we estimated interaction terms between eth-
nicity and the following independent variables: ‘discusses political issues
with member of minority,’ ‘likelihood of ethnic conﬂict,’ ‘political eﬃcacy,’
and ‘negative expectations of the economy.’ For ease of interpretation, we
have subtracted the mean from all interval-level variables.
Model 3 contains many signiﬁcant eﬀects on attitudes towards minority
rights. As our interest is not in these eﬀects on the dependent variable,
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Table 2
Parameter estimates from a multilevel analysis of support for minority rights (N1 ¼ 22,137;
N2 ¼ 59); signiﬁcant eﬀects in bold
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 3.46 (.04) 3.62 (.03) 3.59 (.03) 3.58 (.03)
Individual characteristics
Ethnic polarization
Ethnic majority (ref) — — —
Ethnic minority .59 (.05) .52 (.05) .49 (.05)
Insecurity
Negative expectations economy ).01 (.01) ).01 (.01)
Political eﬃcacy .05 (.01) .05 (.01)
Political eﬃcacy  ethnicity .19 (.02) .18 (.02)
Perceived threat
Likelihood of ethnic conﬂict ).12 (.01) ).12 (.01)
Social diﬀerences
Education
Low education (ref) — —
Medium education ).01 (.01) ).01 (.01)
High education .07 (.02) .07 (.02)
Social class
Manual workers ).01 (.01) ).01 (.01)
Entrepreneurs ).03 (.02) ).03 (.02)
Managers and administrators .03 (.02) .03 (.02)
Intelligentsia ).01 (.02) ).01 (.02)
Peasants ).05 (.02) ).05 (.02)
None of these (ref) — —
Religious denomination
Not religious (ref) — —
Orthodox ).01 (.01) ).01 (.01)
Catholic ).05 (.02) ).05 (.02)
Muslim .17 (.06) .18 (.06)
Protestant ).06 (.02) ).06 (.02)
Other religion .02 (.03) .02 (.03)
Gender
Male (ref) — —
Female .01 (.01) .01 (.01)
Age(*10) .06 (.03) ).01 (.00)
Social distance
Extent of ethnic inter-marriage
Not married (ref) — —
Homogeneous marriage .01 (.01) .01 (.01)
Heterogeneous marriage .04 (.02) .04 (.02)
Discuss political issues with
member of minority
.13 (.01) .13 (.01)
Regional-level characteristics
Language acquisition ).00 (.00)
Language acquisition  ethnicity ).01 (.00)
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but instead concerns their impact on the size of the ethnicity eﬀect, we shall
brieﬂy only summarize these ﬁndings.
First, there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of economic expectations—whether
speciﬁed as a main eﬀect or in interaction with ethnicity. However, respon-
dents with a higher level of political eﬃcacy are more likely to support mi-
nority rights. This eﬀect is stronger for members of minority groups than it
is for members of the majority. Respondents who believe that there is
‘bound to be conﬂict’ between ethnic groups in their country are more likely
to oppose minority rights. This eﬀect is the same for members of minority
groups and those of the majority. Higher educated respondents are also
more supportive of minority rights than are those with basic levels of edu-
cation. The eﬀects of social class are weak, only peasants diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from the (‘no class’) reference category. The main eﬀects of religious de-
nomination are more substantial: Catholics and Protestants are less likely,
and Muslims are more likely, to support minority rights than are the
non-religious. Respondents in cross-ethnic marriages are more supportive
of minority rights than are unmarried respondents and those married to
co-ethnics. There is no interaction with majority/minority status. Respon-
dents who discuss politics with someone from the minority group are more
likely to support minority rights. Neither age nor gender has signiﬁcant
eﬀects.
However, more important for our purposes than the signiﬁcant eﬀects of
these characteristics are the impact that controlling for them has on the size
of the ethnicity eﬀect. The inclusion of the individual-level variables in mod-
el 3 removes approximately 12% (a decrease of .07 from .59) of the ethnicity
eﬀect, as a result of compositional diﬀerences between majority and minority
groups. (In Table 3, we examine more precisely which variables account for
this reduction.)
Finally, model 4 includes, in addition, the eﬀects of the regional-level
variables. The procedure followed in this case was to add to model 3 each
of the regional-level variables and the interaction of these variables with eth-
nicity. Each of these variables (size of minority, extent of majority language
Table 2 (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Religious diﬀerences ).02 (.01)
Religious diﬀerences  ethnicity .03 (.02)
Variance components
Regional level
Constant .09 (.02) .04 (.01) .04 (.01) .03 (.01)
Ethnic group .16 (.03) .15 (.03) .13 (.03)
Constant/ethnic group ).03 (.01) ).02 (.01) ).02 (.01)
Individual level
Constant .50 (.05) .41 (.00) .40 (.00) .40 (.00)
668 G. Evans, A. Need / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 653–680
acquisition by minority, and religious, class, and educational distributions)
together with their interaction with ethnicity was modeled separately be-
cause of the restricted number of regions (59). The signiﬁcant variables were
then retained in model 4.
The results of this model show clearly that regional variations in cultural
diﬀerences between majority and minority ethnic groups have signiﬁcant ef-
fects on regional variations in ethnic polarization and substantially reduce
the between-region variance in ethnic polarization: the higher the level of
majority language acquisition among minority group members, the smaller
the extent of polarization over minority rights; and the larger the religious
diﬀerence between ethnic groups in a region, the larger the extent of polar-
ization between them over minority rights. In regions with smaller religious
diﬀerences, there is less ethnic polarization.
The other eﬀects that were signiﬁcant in model 3 remain much the same.
Next, Table 3 provides information on which variables are ‘doing the
work’ of accounting for ethnic polarization. In this table, we present only
selected eﬀects from Table 2: these are the eﬀects of ethnicity and the vari-
ance components. These eﬀects are presented for each of the ﬁve relevant
models. Each of these models, 2a–2e, drops diﬀerent subsets of the indepen-
dent variables from model 3 in Table 2.
Table 3
Parameter estimates from a multilevel analysis of support for minority rights, eﬀects of selected
models from Table 2 compared with others (N1 ¼ 22,137; N2 ¼ 59)
Model
1 2 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 3 4
Ethnic polarization
Ethnic majority — — — — — — — — —
Ethnic minority — .59 .52 .53 .52 .53 .56 .52 .49
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
Variance components
Regional-level constant .09 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .03
(.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Ethnic group .16 .15 .15 .15 .15 .16 .15 .13
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Constant/ethnic group ).03 ).02 ).02 ).02 ).03 ).02 ).02 ).02
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Individual-level constant .50 .41 .40 .40 .40 .40 .40 .40 .40
(.05) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Model speciﬁcation: Model 1: constants; Model 2: model 1+ eﬀect of ethnicity varying
between regions; Model 2a: model 3) economic insecurity; Model 2b: model 3) political
insecurity; Model 2c: model 3) perceived threat; Model 2d: model 3) social diﬀerences; Model
2e: model 3) social distance; Model 3: model 2+ economic insecurity, political insecurity,
perceived threat, social diﬀerences, and social distance; Model 4: model 3+ regional-level
characteristics.
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It can be seen that the measures of social distance left out of model 2e
have by far the largest impact on ethnic polarization. The eﬀect of ethnicity
changes from .52 to .56, after deleting measures of social distance; the
change is much smaller after deleting other independent variables.
Further reductions in the level of ethnic polarization can be observed by
comparing the coeﬃcient for ethnic polarization in model 3 with that in
model 4. The addition of regional-level variation in majority language ac-
quisition by minority ethnic groups and of religious diﬀerences between ma-
jority and minority ethnic groups reduces the eﬀect of ethnicity from .52 to
.49. Table 3 also informs us about the extent to which we have explained dif-
ferences in ethnic polarization between regions. The between-region vari-
ance of the eﬀect of ethnicity in model 2 was .16: adding the variables
measured at the individual level reduces only the between-region variance
of the eﬀect of ethnicity to .15. Adding the regional level characteristics fur-
ther reduces the between-region variance of the eﬀect of ethnicity to .13.
5.5. Returning to examine country-level diﬀerences
The ﬁnal step in the analysis is to move up from the regional level to the
country level and examine whether in addition to the individual- and region-
al-level characteristics, country-level measures of the contextual explanatory
variables can account for ethnic polarization over minority rights. We mea-
sured the contextual variables for each of the 13 countries in the analysis.
Given this small number, these estimates are less likely to be robust than are
those from the individual and regional-level analyses and any potentially sig-
niﬁcant relationships are likely to be diﬃcult to detect. Nevertheless, we exam-
ined the zero-order correlations between the explanatory variables and ethnic
polarization at the country level. The only substantial correlation with ethnic
polarization is found for the size of the minority in a country (r ¼ :42), but gi-
ven the small number of observations, even this is not signiﬁcant at P ¼ :05.To
check that the independent variables may nonetheless have an impact, each of
the country-level variables was also added to model 4 in Table 2. Again, no
country-level eﬀects approached statistical signiﬁcance.
Finally, as we have seen, several individual- and regional-level explanatory
variables aﬀect ethnic polarization over minority rights. Now, we examine to
what extent these factors have accounted for the observed diﬀerences in ethnic
polarization between Eastern European countries. Table 4 compares the pre-
dicted values forminority rights support, derived from each of themodels pre-
sented in Table 3 with the observed values shown in Table 1. Thus, the
predictions in model 1 are those derived from model 1 in Table 2. This esti-
mates the average score on the minority rights scale. Therefore, it predicts
the same value on the dependent variable for themajority and for theminority
and as there is no variation between regions the predicted value is the same in
all countries. In model 2 in Table 2, we also include a parameter for ethnicity:
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Table 4
Ethnic polarization in Eastern Europe: mean score and predicted scores on right scale (ethnic
polarization in bold)
















Majority 3.47 3.58 3.33 3.36 3.39 862
Minority 3.74 3.58 3.82 3.91 3.99 269
.27 .00 .49 .55 .60
Bulgaria
Majority 2.83 3.58 3.33 3.33 3.16 1476
Minority 3.37 3.58 3.82 3.96 3.88 273
.54 .00 .49 .63 .72
Czech Rep.
Majority 2.73 3.58 3.33 3.31 3.46 1411
Minority 3.21 3.58 3.82 3.79 3.69 52
.48 .00 .49 .48 .23
Estonia
Majority 2.67 3.58 3.33 3.31 3.25 1257
Minority 4.24 3.58 3.82 3.91 4.16 713
1.57 .00 .49 .60 .91
Hungary
Majority 3.17 3.58 3.33 3.28 3.39 1237
Minority 3.60 3.58 3.82 3.79 3.68 40
.43 .00 .49 .51 .29
Latvia
Majority 2.77 3.58 3.33 3.31 3.17 1205
Minority 3.84 3.58 3.82 3.91 4.00 787
1.07 .00 .49 .60 .83
Lithuania
Majority 3.10 3.58 3.33 3.31 3.27 1599
Minority 3.91 3.58 3.82 3.86 3.87 401
.81 .00 .49 .55 .60
Moldova
Majority 3.23 3.58 3.33 3.30 3.41 1152
Minority 3.89 3.58 3.82 3.89 4.05 476
.66 .00 .49 .59 .64
Poland
Majority 3.13 3.58 3.33 3.27 3.38 1574
Minority 3.44 3.58 3.82 3.76 3.63 40
.31 .00 .49 .49 .25
Romania
Majority 3.15 3.58 3.33 3.30 3.08 1331
Minority 3.97 3.58 3.82 3.77 3.70 224
.82 .00 .49 .47 .62
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therefore, predictions based on this model give diﬀerent scores on the depen-
dent variable formajority andminority ethnic groups.However, we do not in-
clude any variables that can explain diﬀerences between regions. Therefore,
the same value is predicted for each of the countries. In model 3, we add the
individual-level explanatory variables to model 2. Finally, in model 4, we also
add regional-level explanatory variables.
To evaluate how well the predicted polarization in each of the models
approximates the observed values, the bottom row of Table 4 presents the
‘mean absolute error in polarization.’ This ﬁgure is calculated from the dif-
ferences (whether plus or minus) between the observed scores on the minor-
ity rights scale and the predicted scores summed over countries divided by
the number of countries. We can see from this that, on average, model 4 best
predicts ethnic polarization over support for minority rights. This is indi-
cated by the sum of the error being closest to 0 in model 4. In other words,
in this model, the predictions come closest to the actual score on ethnic po-
larization—although it does not predict the attitudes of minority members
and majority members equally well in all countries. In Moldova, Poland,
and Russia, for example, the model predicts ethnic polarization reasonably
well. But predictions based on the model do not ﬁt as well in Estonia and
Slovakia. This is not surprising given that we model ethnic polarization
for all countries simultaneously, and to begin with the fact Estonia and Slo-
vakia had particularly high levels of polarization.
Table 4 (continued)

















Majority 3.28 3.58 3.33 3.32 3.34 1648
Minority 3.68 3.58 3.82 3.93 3.81 198
.40 .00 .49 .61 .47
Slovakia
Majority 2.84 3.58 3.33 3.28 3.39 1253
Minority 3.86 3.58 3.82 3.84 3.86 211
1.02 .00 .49 .56 .47
Ukraine
Majority 3.57 3.58 3.33 3.33 3.40 1789
Minority 3.85 3.58 3.82 3.91 4.00 679




.666 .294 .286 .248
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6. Discussion and conclusions
6.1. The general ﬁndings of the analysis
We have seen that ethnic polarization between majority and minority
groups is explained most eﬀectively by social distance, as indicated by the
extent of ethnic inter-marriage and social interaction. In addition, cul-
tural diﬀerences, as indicated by variations in the extent of majority lan-
guage acquisition by minority groups and group diﬀerences in religion
between regions, account for a signiﬁcant proportion of the regional vari-
ation in the extent of polarization. Regions with minorities who speak
the titular language of a country have less polarization between ethnic
groups in attitudes towards minority rights. Similarly, regions where eth-
nic groups share religious aﬃliation experience less polarization. These
ﬁndings accord with research in the West, indicating the importance of
cultural diﬀerences as a source of racial and anti-immigrant prejudice
(see Pettigrew, 1998) and historical analyses by Brubaker (1996) on
post-communist Europe that emphasizes the cultural and linguistic as-
pects of nationalism, while, importantly, giving no support to theories
of ethnic polarization, which focus on economic factors, structural diﬀer-
ences and similarities, minority group, and perceived threat of ethnic con-
ﬂict.
This latter ﬁnding stands in opposition to the tradition of recent work
into attitudes towards immigrants (i.e., Coenders, 2001; Quillian, 1995).
Thus, while his study of a mixture of both post-communist and Western
countries observes that, ‘In accordance with ethnic competition theory, per-
ceived ethnic threat, ethnic exclusionism, and chauvinism were all related to
declining economic conditions,’ Coenders’ work looks at attitudes towards
minority immigrants, not formerly dominant minorities (2001, p. 191). The
implication is clear: the minorities in our study are primarily composed of
groups who were at one time the dominant ethnic groups in the countries
in which they are now only minorities. Therefore, general economic theories
of majority attitudes toward immigrants or political tolerance may not hold
in the transitional countries where ethnic polarization reﬂects these sorts of
historically entrenched relations. Attitudes towards established formerly
dominant minorities are plausibly more culturally and historically
rooted—though not necessarily primordial (cp. Brubaker, 1996)—and thus
less responsive to economic circumstances. In this sense, our ﬁndings ﬁt well
with Blumer’s general theory of prejudice for inter- and intra-racial rela-
tions. His model emphasizes that ‘identity, stereotypes, values, and assess-
ments of interests are shaped historically and involve a collective and
relational dimension between groups that powerfully engages emergent nor-
mative ideas and appropriate group statuses and entitlements’ (Bobo and
Hutchings, 1996, p. 968).
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The historical endogeneity emphasized by Blumer likewise makes sense of
ﬁndings concerning the inconsistent impact of social distance measures on
ethnic polarization. Thus, we have shown that social distance (inter-mar-
riage, political interaction) aﬀects ethnic polarization in ways which suggest
that individuals who are involved in cross-ethnic interactions and relation-
ships have less polarized opinions about minority rights than do those
who are not. Clearly, when considering multivariate models with these many
explanatory factors, we need to remember that many of the variables used to
predict ethnic polarization are themselves inter-related. Moreover, some of
these factors can be assumed to causally precede others. In this respect, these
social distance indicators might be considered to be particularly endoge-
nous, in that they are conditioned by some of the other independent vari-
ables (see also Dustmann and Preston, 2001). Nevertheless, the eﬀects of
measures of social distance are estimated net of other conditioning factors:
social distance is an aspect of ethnic relations that impacts on ethnic polar-
ization over attitudes towards rights even when insecurity, threat, and struc-
tural and cultural diﬀerence are taken into account.
However, we can gain further insights into the nature of these social dis-
tance eﬀects from the use of multi-level methodology that do cast some doubt
on their causal signiﬁcance, even when their eﬀects are found after controlling
for alternative inﬂuences such as insecurity, threat, and structural and cultural
diﬀerences. This is because we ﬁnd only signiﬁcant eﬀects at the individual le-
vel. Once the eﬀects of this level of personal contact are controlled for, individ-
uals who live in regions where there is on average more inter-marriage and
interaction do not have less polarized opinions than individuals living in re-
gions where social distance is smaller. In other words, the eﬀect of social dis-
tance on levels of variation in ethnic polarization is compositional rather than
contextual in form. Clearly, a plausible explanation for this failure to ﬁnd con-
textual eﬀects is that there is a tendency for people with less polarized attitudes
to engage in cross-ethnic relations, so that it is the attitude that precedes the
action rather than the other way around. This reversal of the direction of in-
ﬂuence could explain the observed relationships at the individual level. If this
were not the case, we might also expect to see such eﬀects at the contextual le-
vel, which is more clearly distinct from the diﬃculties of interpretation in-
volved in deciding whether individuals’ attitudes cause their interaction with
ethnically dissimilar others or vice versa.
A further important point to take out from our study is that most of the
variations in ethnic polarization are simply not accounted for, even by the ex-
tensive range of independent variables examined in our analysis. There remain
marked diﬀerences between countries in their predicted and observed levels of
ethnic polarization. This suggests that to account for these discrepancies we
must turn to aspects of the histories of particular countries in the region. So,
for example, in Estonia—the most polarized of our nations even after ﬁtting
the models examined in Table 3—it is not surprising that the titular ethnicity
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perceives the large and formerly dominant Russian minority as a speciﬁc
threat to their newfound national integrity (Evans, 1998; Evans and Lips-
meyer, 2001). This threat is likely to be exacerbated by the presence of an ex-
tended and still nominally disputed border with Russia, which includes areas
where Russian-speakers dominate numerically. In combination with 50 years
of military occupation and settlement of ethnic Russians in the country, pre-
ceded prior 1918 by two centuries of Imperial control, we have conditions in
which the expression of negative inter-group attitudes and support for exclu-
sionary practices againstRussians, including those limiting voting and citizen-
ship rights, are particularly likely to occur. That such successor states are
characterized by greater fear of irredentism has been argued before (Evans
and Whiteﬁeld, 1993). A similar point applies to Slovakia, which again dis-
plays high levels of unexplained polarization between the Slovak majority
and their Hungarian-speaking minority. Again, this is a very recently created
successor state and the history of the region both before and after theTreaty of
Versailles and the presence of Hungary on the new state’s southern border
probably serve to accentuate the insecurity of the Slovaks.2
6.2. Conclusions and implications
That history should still count, evenwhen aspects of context and individual
experience are taken into account, is not itself remarkable.What themultilevel
analysis presented here also suggests, however, and this is somewhat surpris-
ing, is that many of the explanations speciﬁed in social scientiﬁc discussions of
ethnic divisions, and inter-group relations more generally—economic experi-
ence, political representation, structural diﬀerences, the size of the minority in
a region—even contextual factors such as level of cross-ethnic interaction—
appear to play no part in accounting for the degree of ethnic polarization in
attitudes towards minority rights in the former communist states of Eastern
Europe. Ethnic groups in this region are most polarized, when they diﬀer in
linguistic and religious character. In other words, to the degree that we can ac-
count for ethnic polarization, it is most conﬁdently in terms of cultural diﬀer-
ences between ethnic groups rather than those of an economic, political, or
structural nature. This we attribute to the nature of the majority–minority
relations in the region, reﬂecting as it does dynamics derived from, in some
cases, centuries of ethnic diﬀerentiation with groups that now formminorities
being at one time those who formed the ruling majority.
2 Though it also appears that at times cultural and historical elements combine to inﬂuence
the level of polarization. Residential segregation, for example, remains a problem in Estonia
and Latvia, while Lithuanians have witnessed a more inclusive society. Chinn and Kaiser (1996,
p. 118) explain this occurrence as a diﬀerence in attitudes among Lithuanians compared with
people in the other Baltic states: ‘While characterizing Moscow as the enemy, Lithuanians were
not hostile to Russians living among them. In contrast to the segregation of Tallinn and Riga,
Russians live among Lithuanians in Vilnius and most other cities.’
G. Evans, A. Need / Social Science Research 31 (2002) 653–680 675
Themost obvious implications of these ﬁndings are for policy implementa-
tion, designed to reduce ethnic polarization in the region. The sources of ethnic
polarization can be expected to inﬂuence the political manageability of ethnic
relations and by extension the likelihood of stable democracy (see Diamond
and Plattner, 1994; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Lipset, 1994). If diﬀerences in atti-
tudes between ethnic groups in Eastern Europe are inﬂuenced by recent expe-
riences of a potentially changing nature, such as the considerable economic
problems associated with transition, they are also more likely to be amenable
to amelioration through internal policy-making or external intervention by
bodies such as the European Union or the International Monetary Fund.
Where group diﬀerences are not reducible to contingent phenomena relating
to economic distribution and political representation and result instead from
cultural distinctiveness and long-standing antipathy, they present much more
intractable political diﬃculties for democratic consolidation. In the divided
countries we have examined, this latter account seems unlikely: Intervention
and democratic consolidation will, thus, be more diﬃcult to achieve.
Appendix A. The surveys
Sampling frame Sampling Response rate




2. 26 settlements Achieved sample: 1200














Czech Republic Adult pop (18+) 1. 8 regions Names issued: 2104
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Appendix A (continued)
Sampling frame Sampling Response rate
Estonia Adult pop (18+) 1. 5 regions Names issued: 2285
1989 census of
households
2. 15 counties Achieved sample: 2029
















Spring 1994 3. Random selection
of individuals
Latvia Adult pop (18+) 1. 5 regions Addresses issued: 2925
Random route 2. 403 sampling
points
Achieved sample: 2000

















Moldova Adult pop (18+) 1. 80 sampling
points
Names issued: 2734





Poland Adult pop (18+) 1. 8 regions Names issued: 2040
Summer 1993 Central Register
of Individuals
2. 4 types of
settlements
Achieved sample: 1729
Romania Adult pop (18+) 1. 4 provinces Names issued: 2000
Electoral Records 2. 4 types of
settlements
Achieved sample: 1621
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